

# UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER
AD827538
NEW LIMITATION CHANGE
TO Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Administrative/Operational Use; 31 Jan 1967. Other requests shall be referred to Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, DC 20310.
AUTHORITY
OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO  
AGAM-P (M) (29 Jun 67) FOR OT

5 July 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 37th Signal  
Battalion (Spt)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 37th Signal Battalion (Spt) for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 Incl  
as

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding General  
US Army Combat Development Command  
US Continental Army Command  
Commanding Officer  
US Army Security Agency Training Center & School  
Commandants  
US Army Command and General Staff College  
US Army Air Defense School  
US Army Armor School  
US Army Artillery and Missile School  
US Army Chemical Corps School  
US Army Engineer School  
US Army Military Police School  
US Army Infantry School  
US Army Intelligence School

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

FEB 28 1968

THE MARKING FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
IS CANCELED WHEN SEPARATED FROM  
PROTECTED MATERIAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OT RD  
670138

**BLANK PAGE**

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

US Army Medical Field Service School  
US Army Ordnance School  
US Army Quartermaster School  
US Army Signal School  
US Army Transportation School  
US Army Special Warfare School  
US Army Civil Affairs School  
US Army Aviation School

### Copies furnished:

Joint Chiefs of Staff (SASM)  
Director of Defense Research and Engineering  
Office, Chief of Staff, US Army  
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations  
Deputy Chief of Staff for  
Logistics  
Chief of Research and Development  
Assistant Chiefs of Staff  
Chief of Engineers  
The Surgeon General  
Chief of Communications-Electronics  
The Provost Marshal General  
Commanding Generals  
US Army Weapons Command  
Commanding Officer  
37th Signal Battalion (Spt)  
Research Analysis Corporation  
Security Officer  
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration

100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10
100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10
100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10
100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10
100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10
100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10
100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10
100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10
100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10
100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10	100-100000-10

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 37TH SIGNAL BATTALION (SPT)  
APO 96337

SCGVAG-DH-OP

31 January 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1967, Reports Control Symbol CSFO: -65.

TO: Deputy Commanding General  
United States Army Vietnam  
ATTN: AVC-HD  
APO 96307

1. References: a. AR 525, dated 29 October 1959, Subject: Combat Operation Command Report.

b. AR 1-19, dated 26 May 1966, Subject: Operational Reports--  
Lessons Learned.

c. 1st Signal Brigade Regulation 870-2, dated 5 October 1966,  
Subject: Historical Activities.

2. The following report is submitted in accordance with the above references.

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OF UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. General: a. The 37th Signal Battalion was activated on 20 October by General Orders #53, Headquarters USASTRATCOM, Washington, D.C. dated 29 July 1966 and General Order #66, Headquarters 1st Signal Brigade (USASTRATCOM) APO 96307, dated 8 October 1966. During the period 1 November 1966 to 31 January, activities, other than normal operations centered around the formation of the Battalion, its operating procedures, and the internal flow of information.

b. The Battalion's mission is to provide and insure:

(1) tactical communications support to III Marine Amphibious Force and other Free World Forces located in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

(2) communications support for the Advisory effort located in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

FOR OT RP  
67013E

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SGCVNG-DN-OP

31 January 1967

2

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1967, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65.

(3) area communications support to logistical complexes and U.S. Government Agencies in the I Corps Tactical Zone (local switchboards, long distant switchboards, communication centers, dial central office and tributaries);

(4) administrative support and real estate acquisition for all elements of the 1st Signal Brigade in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

c. The Battalion started the quarter with a Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, and by the end of the quarter, Companies A, B, and C had been activated.

2. Attachments and detachments: None

3. Organization:

a. The organic companies of the Battalion were organized by USASTRATCOM General Order #53 and 1st Signal Brigade General Order #66 on the following dates:

(1) C Company - 14 November 1966

(2) B Company - 15 November 1966

(3) A Company - 16 November 1966

b. As of 31 January 1967, the 37th Signal Battalion structure consisted of: Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, A Company, B Company and C Company.

c. Under MTO&E 11-5000, the authorized strength of the Battalion is 573-26 Officers, 13 Warrant Officers, and 534 Enlisted Men.

4. Personnel and Administration:

a. During November and December 1966 and the first half of January 1967, personnel shortages constituted a well defined problem area. During the latter half of January 1967, the situation started to improve as personnel commenced arriving to fill out the TO. The Battalion still has a serious shortage in the following MOS's:

31K Cryptographic Repairman

31L Radio Relay Equipment Repairman

31M Radio Relay Attendant

31N Tactical Circuit Controller

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SCOVING-DN-OP

31 January 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1967, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65.

- 51L Refrigeration Specialist
- 63B Wheel Vehicle Mechanic
- 72B Communications Center Specialist
- 76A Supply Clerk
- 76C Engineer Supply and Parts Specialist
- 76D Ordnance Supply Parts Specialist
- 76H Transportation Supply Parts Specialist
- 76K General Supply Supervisor
- 94B Cook

b. Up to 27 January, administrative support was provided by the 41st Signal Battalion. On that date, records and clerical personnel were moved to Headquarters 37th Signal Battalion.

5. Intelligence: None

6. Operations:

a. The general mission and area of responsibility of the 37th Signal Battalion did not change during the quarter. The 37th Signal Battalion has operational control of all communications elements organic to the 21st Signal Group in the I Corps Tactical Zone. The I Corps Tactical Zone is comprised of the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, covering 10,329 square miles and extending from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) south to an east west boundary approximately 30 kilometers south of Quang Ngai City.

b. The companies of the Battalion operate ten signal sites in the I Corps Tactical Zone. "A" Company, co-located with Battalion Headquarters in Da Nang, operates the Battalion communications facilities in Da Nang and Hoi An. "B" Company, presently in Hue, operates the Battalion communications facilities in Hue, Phu Bai, Quang Tri and Dong Ha. "C" Company, in Chu Lai, operates the Battalion communications facilities in Chu Lai, Chu Lai South, Tam Ky and Quang Ngai (See Inclosure I).

c. The chart below outlines the Communications facilities as of 31 January operated by the 37th Signal Battalion and the 362nd Signal (Light Troop) in the I Corps Tactical Zone.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SCGVNG-DN-OP

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1967, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65.

4

### LONG LINES COMMUNICATIONS

VHF Systems (12 Channel)	11
Tropo Systems (24 Channel) (362nd Signal Company)	4
16 Channel Tone Packs	4
8 Channel Tone Packs	3
4 Channel Tone Packs	3
Voice Circuits	181
Teletype Circuits	61

### COMMUNICATIONS CENTER OPERATIONS

Major Relay Station	9
Minor Relay Stations	1
Tributary Stations (Comm Center)	3

### TELEPHONE SWITCHBOARD OPERATIONS

600-Line Manual Switchboards	0
200-Line Manual Switchboards	4
60-Line Manual Switchboards	5
30-Line Manual Switchboards	0
12-Line Manual Switchboards	0
Subscriber Phones	505

### RADIO OPERATIONS

HF Radio Nets	2
HF Radio Stations	5
AFRS Stations	2

### CONTROL CENTERS

ACCC	1
------	---

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SCGVNG-DN-OP

31 January 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1967, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65.

c. No new VHF or Tropo systems were installed by the 37th Signal Battalion during the Quarter.

d. In November, three AN/TRC-24 radio sets located in the 37th Signal Compound at Da Nang were moved from vans to a radio building. With ample room for the equipment, increased working space for the operators and maintenance personnel, and improved air circulation around the equipment, the quality and reliability of the systems have increased. The number of operators required per shift was reduced.

e. During the first half of November, the 37th Signal Battalion supported the 1st ARVN Division Advisory Team with radio teletype communications during a major operation. Two radio sets AN/GRC-46 and teams are prepared to support I Corps Advisory Teams when requested.

f. During November, the inside plant communications cable at the Hue VHF terminal was completely renovated and complete cable records and trouble shooting charts were prepared. This improved both the reliability of the circuits and their responsiveness to current Advisor needs.

g. In November, new power cable from the commercial source to the Hue signal site was installed and internal wiring improved. The entire facility was connected to the grounding system constructed by Page Communications for the IWCS site. AC hum on telephones was eliminated, and the power system made more stable and reliable.

h. The rehabilitation of the outside cable plant in the city of Da Nang continued. During the riots in the spring of 1966, the cable plant was severely damaged. Over 500 circuit miles have been rehabilitated. In addition, the outside cable plants in Quang Ngai, Quang Tri and Tam Ky were rehabilitated due both to deterioration and changing Advisor needs.

i. In December 1966, an AN/MTC-1 switchboard and cable plant were installed at Dong Ha to meet expanding communications requirements. The cut over from the existing Air Force AN/GTA-6 switchboard to the AN/MTC-1 was completed on 19 December 1966. The impact of the installation has been improved service, the availability of more immediate long distance access to commanders, capacity for subscriber growth, and flexibility for future needs.

j. On 29 December 1966, the Hoi An signal site switched from generator to commercial power. This has resulted in more reliable and stable power. Each signal site will be wired for commercial or base power when available. Tactical generators will be used as backup.

### 7. Training

a. Over seventy-five per cent of the assigned strength received training in mandatory subjects during the quarter. Due to the shortage of personnel, classes were repeated so that the maximum number of personnel could attend and still not hinder the operational mission.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SCCVNG-DN-OF

31 January 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1967, Reports Control System CEFOR-65.

b. Fifty-five enlisted personnel received cross training in MOS's critical to the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Command interest is placed on an active, continuing cross training program to insure that the temporary personnel shortages which occur due to rotation, sickness, and emergency leave, do not hinder the operational mission.

### 8. Logistics:

a. The problem of power generating equipment is serious. The present percentage of generators that are deadlined (on hand and in higher echelon) is 58 per cent. A great deal of dependency is being placed on the availability of commercial power. An enemy strike, aimed at these commercial sources would eventually affect near total outages of mission equipment at some of our sites. Maintenance and supply support for power generators is a major problem.

b. Transportation of equipment is another problem. Deadlined equipment must be evacuated approximately 150 air miles for repair support. Lengthy transportation waiting time results in additional deadline time. Contact maintenance teams to repair equipment in place would decrease the deadline time of equipment and ease our problem insofar as transportation delay is concerned.

c. Red Ball Express requisition "fills" for electronic equipment are increasing, but still remain at a critical percentage. The nadir of fill occurred during November when we had a 5% of fill. In December, we received 12% and in January 18%. Since the arrival of Colonel Morgan, C.O. Da Nang, Sub-Area Command, percent of fill has shown a marked upward trend, but not enough for sustained operations. (It should be noted that for the first two weeks of February the percent of fill on outstanding red ball requisitions jumped to 59%).

d. The present percentage of vehicles on-hand is 37 per cent of authorization. Most critical among these are Truck, Cargo 2 1/2 Ton, and Truck, Cargo 3/4 Ton. Of the eighteen 2 1/2 ton trucks on-hand, sixteen are obsolete models, M-211 and one is model M-135 which is also obsolete. There are seven obsolete model M-37 3/4 ton trucks on-hand. Parts are difficult to obtain to keep these vehicles operational.

e. Individual arms (rifles and pistols) have been a problem. Thirty-five individuals assigned to the 37th Signal Battalion have no weapons issued to them. This number will increase as personnel requisitions are filled.

f. Maximum effort is being exerted by the 37th Signal Battalion, the 21st Signal Group, the 1st Signal Brigade and the Da Nang Sub-Area Command (1st Logistical Command) to solve the deficiencies in the supply field.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SCCVNG-DN-OP

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

31 January 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1967, Reports Control Symbol GSPOR-65.

9. Aviation: The Battalion has not yet received the personnel or equipment scheduled for the Aviation Section. Aviation support is coordinated by the 21st Signal Group and normally is provided by the 41st Signal Battalion. The nature of the conflict and terrain dictates that most of the equipment, personnel, and supplies be moved by air. Air lift support from other military agencies is often a long, difficult process. Excessive system downtime results from the lack of organic transportation to move personnel and transportation to move maintenance personnel and spare equipment.

### SECTION II

#### COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

##### Part 1. Observations (Lessons Learned)

##### 1. ITEM: Challenge to Personnel Extending

a. DISCUSSION: Special attention is necessary for those men extending their tour in Vietnam, and who remain in the same assignment. Problems can develop especially if the local civilian areas are on limits. A man confronted with such a situation can easily become physically distracted or mentally tired. He may lack stimulation on the job or he may be preoccupied with events in the town. Efforts should be made to provide personnel with a variety of challenging assignments when they serve in a confined or isolated atmosphere. Thirty-three percent of the men eligible to rotate extended during the last quarter.

b. OBSERVATION: The above suggestion might prove helpful when personnel extend and then show a noticeable decline in effectiveness and job performance. A man who extends and knows he is doing a good job—and above all, knows that this is appreciated—sets an excellent example to others. Permitting a second promotion in Vietnam for soldiers who extend and do an outstanding job also provides strong incentive. The gain to the Army is both decreased demand on the personnel pipeline and increased effective time, because you do not have a new man to train.

##### 2. ITEM: Technical Supervision (Operations)

a. DISCUSSION: Some highly complex items of signal equipment have come into the country without personnel fully trained in their installation and maintenance. Often modifications are necessary within a month or so to up-grade the equipment to meet standards of later models. Installation of this equipment by untrained personnel may be improper; installation time is usually excessive, and the subsequent operation may be degraded in quality.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SCCVNG-DN-OP

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

31 January 1967

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1967, Reports Control Symbol CofOR-65.

b. **OBSERVATION:** When items of signal equipment are to be installed and operated by a certain date, and trained personnel are not available, technical representatives of the manufacturer should accompany the equipment to supervise that installation, and make modifications as needed, and help train qualified personnel.

**3. ITEM: Buildings for Signal Equipment at Semi-Permanent Sites (Operations)**

a. **DISCUSSION:** When several pieces of VHF, radio equipment and switchboards are installed at semi-permanent signal sites, attempts should be made to construct a building and remove the equipment from vans. This will allow for better air circulation, more room in which operators and maintenance personnel can work, and will reduce the actual number of operators required at a multiple system site.

b. **OBSERVATION:** Since moving three VHF terminals into a building on the 37th Signal Battalion's compound, system reliability and quality has improved; and system outages from equipment failure have decreased.

**4. ITEM: Cross Training (Training)**

a. **DISCUSSION:** Cross training of signal personnel in Vietnam is essential due to rotation, emergency leaves, and the long personnel pipeline.

b. **OBSERVATION:** Without a cross training program, the 37th Signal Battalion would have been hard pressed to accomplish its mission, especially in November and December when personnel shortages were a major problem. When a signalman knows more than one job, not only is he more valuable to the Army, but you have an invaluable insurance policy on continued operations during adverse personnel situations.

**5. ITEM: Aviation Section (Operations)**

a. **DISCUSSION:** The 37th Signal Battalion operated this quarter without the benefit of an aviation section. With ten signal sites separated by wide distances and enemy infested areas, equipment, supplies, and personnel have to be moved by air. It is often difficult to arrange flights from other military agencies. Excessive system outage time was often the result when aircraft were not available to move maintenance personnel and replacement equipment.

b. **OBSERVATION:** Operations would have been easier and in many cases the length of system outages could have been reduced had aircraft been immediately available. Battalions activated or coming into the country with a support mission covering a large area should have operational, organic sections.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

SCGVNG-DW-OP

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

31 January 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1967, Reports Control Symbol GSFOR-65.

9  
**6. ITEM: Assuming Responsibility of Primary Circuit Controller (Operations)**

a. DISCUSSION: A large number of circuits, especially teletype circuits, terminate at Phu Bai. These circuits pass over numerous systems and pass through several technical control facilities. In the past, these circuits would remain out for an excessive period of time. One of the causes for this was that various technical controls were too busy to devote full time to the restoration of the circuits. A technical control facility has been organized by the 37th Signal Battalion personnel at Phu Bai. Utilizing common user telephone circuits, order wires, and other channels to by-pass senior TCG's, the controllers talk to other TCG's, RLT's and the subscribers themselves, in an effort to bring the circuits back to traffic.

b. OBSERVATION: As the result of the 37th Signal Battalion personnel acting as primary controllers at Phu Bai, the downtime of circuits has been reduced. Often the only way to keep large numbers of long distance circuits operating is for personnel at the distant terminal to assume the responsibility of primary circuit controllers.

**7. ITEM: Controller Records (Operations)**

a. DISCUSSION: In acting as controller for large numbers of circuits, it has been found helpful to write verbal narratives of all unusual situations such as outages, pre-emption, alternate routings, circuit adjustments and realignments. Since problems with circuits passing through many systems and various transmission media are often due to coordination difficulties, it is important to accumulate information in a manner analogous to the collection of equipment maintenance data.

b. OBSERVATION: It has been found, especially at Phu Bai, that a written record on circuit outages often provides clues to the solution of recurring problems, and the prevention of others. These records are invaluable for subsequent trouble-shooting, as well as a training media for newly assigned personnel. In addition, written narratives of circuit difficulties are a source of accurate and detailed material for reports; and are a source of information for command action when required.

**8. ITEM: Alertness to Trouble (Operations)**

a. DISCUSSION: Appearance of any condition causing a degradation of performance of any system or circuit, however minor, should be cause for immediate action to rectify the situation. Full time effort should be devoted until the problem is isolated and solved. An example of this was an annoying intermittent AC hum on the telephone system at one of the signal sites. Investigations revealed a defect in the grounding and commercial power systems. A major project involving a new power feed and wiring system was initiated to correct the problem.

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

SCOVNG-UN-OP

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

31 January 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1967, Reports Control Symbol CSMR-65.

b. OBSERVATION: An alert supervisor or manager finds trouble before it happens. In the case above, the original symptoms of the trouble were corrected, but, more than that, the benefits in terms of future reliability and quality will continue indefinitely. This is a case of where a problem was solved before it became critical and caused an outage - the hallmark of a good signal site commander.

Part 2. Recommendations (Lessons Learned)

1. It is recommended that a second promotion be allowed those personnel extending their tours in Vietnam and who are doing an outstanding job.
2. With now and highly complex signal equipment being programmed into Vietnam, it is recommended that technical representatives be at each site where and when the equipment is installed and tested. If modifications are necessary, he can supervise or make them. The technical representative should remain a sufficient length of time to insure quality standards of operation and maintenance. This will reduce installation time and will provide more reliability to communication systems.
3. It is recommended that plans be developed for several types of standard buildings to be constructed on signal sites in Vietnam to house VHF, radio equipment, and switchboards at semi-permanent signal sites. This will prolong the life of the equipment as well as increase their reliability.
4. It is recommended that each signal battalion scheduled to be activated in Vietnam, or coming to Vietnam, which will have a large area to support, be provided with an operational, organic aviation section. This will alleviate many problems created by a lack of transportation.
5. It is recommended that maintenance contact teams be formed at field maintenance and depot level. They would be sent to areas where there is a high density of equipment and no major maintenance facilities.

*Herbert C. Hollander*  
HERBERT C. HOLLANDER  
LTC, SigC  
Commanding

1 Incl  
as

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

10

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

//

SCCVNG-SY (31 Jan 67) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 January  
1967 (RCS-CSFOR-65)

Headquarters, 21st Signal Group, APO 96240 25 February 1967

THRU: Deputy Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVC-DH, APO 96307

THRU: Commander in Chief, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army (ACSFOR, DA), Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Transmitted herewith is one copy of Headquarters, 37th Signal Battalion Report, Subject: Same as above.
2. Concur with observations made by CO, 37th Signal Battalion, with the exceptions noted below.
3. Requisitions for personnel and aircraft were submitted prior to the activation of the 37th Signal Battalion. Information available to this Headquarters indicates that personnel will be assigned in the near future. Aircraft are programmed for the 37th Signal Battalion and will be issued as soon as command assets and combat unit requirements permit. Until such time that aircraft are issued, support is being provided from within the internal assets of the 21st Signal Group.
4. The Commander's observations and recommendations in Item 6, emphasize the constant difficulty of troubleshooting and restoring circuits that pass through more than one tech control. To effectively trouble shoot a circuit, the actions of the individual equipment operator must be coordinated with those of the tech controller. This has been extremely difficult to accomplish since the technical controllers and the equipment operators belong to two different organizations.
5. The rate of dealined equipment is excessive (generators 58%) and repair parts requisitioned through Red Ball Express have not been received as they should have. Since the arrival of the new CO, Da Nang Subarea

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

12

SCCVNG-SY (31 Jan 67)                      1st Ind                      25 February 1967  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 January  
          1967 (RCS-CSFOR-65)

Command, the requisitions that have been filled have increased from a rate of 5% in November to 59% in the last week of January. Although this shows a marked upward trend, it is not enough to sustain operations.

HUNTER L. SHARP  
Colonel, SigC  
Commanding



13

SOCCOP (31 Jan 67)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967 (RCS CSFCR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST SIGNAL BRIGADE (USASTRATCOM), APO San Francisco 96307 14 MAR 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVC-DN, APO 96307

Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Communications Command, Washington, D.C. 20315

1. IAW AR 1-19, subject report from the 37th Signal Battalion is forwarded.

2. Reference section 1 paragraph 4c. All personnel of the 37th Signal Battalion now have individual arms. The procedures which resulted in creating the reported shortage have been corrected.

3. Concur in Commander's Comments and Recommendations as modified by 1st Indorsement with the following comments:

a. Commander's Observation and Recommendation Item 6 and paragraph 4, 1st Indorsement. This headquarters is aware of problems that have occurred in technical control operations. A study has been conducted and directives are being published to improve the techniques and procedures employed.

b. Reference Recommendation 2. This headquarters has commented on problems that occur when new equipments are introduced into the theater in previous Operational Reports. Whenever possible technical representatives are made available or special schools are conducted on installation, operation and maintenance of new equipment.

FOR THE COMMANDER

1 Incl  
as

WILLIAM A. HIGGINS  
Colonel, SigC  
Deputy

13

**BLANK PAGE**

15  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AVHGC-DH (31 Jan 67) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 9630719 APR 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 37th Signal Battalion (Support) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Paragraph 8a, Page 6, concerning generators: Concur with unit statement of a major problem. Paragraph 5, 1st Indorsement reflects a significant increase in repair parts availability. The unit should continue to emphasize the use of Red Ball Express for deadlined equipment. PLL's should be reviewed and upgraded where demands reveal a requirement. In addition, this headquarters has authorized units to requisition replacement generators in accordance with the concept outlined in TB 5-6100-201-15. Increased supply of new generators is required to adequately implement a repair by replacement program, since current in-country assets are limited.

b. Reference Paragraph 8b, Page 6, and Paragraph 5, Part II, Section II, Page 10, concerning excessive distance for maintenance support: Concur in unit comments. USARV ADMINO 1-67 specifies that maintenance contact teams can be requested to assist units when conditions warrant this type of maintenance.

c. Reference Paragraph 8c, Page 6, concerning Red Ball Express (RBE) requisition fill: Concur with unit. The Red Ball system has proven to be highly responsive overall. In the absence of specific parts listings for the signal battalion requirements this headquarters cannot comment further. Unit should continue to utilize RBE and adjust PLL's as required.

d. Reference Paragraph 8d, Page 6, pertaining to vehicle shortages: Concur. As M35A2 2½ ton trucks arrive in this command, TOE shortages will be filled, followed by replacement of obsolete vehicles. The 3/4 ton vehicle shortages should be alleviated with the arrival of the M715 1½ ton vehicles during the 1st Quarter of FY 68.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

16  
19 APR 1967

AVHGC-DH (31 Jan 67)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65)

e. Reference Paragraph 9, Page 7; Paragraph 5, Page 8; and Paragraph 4, Page 10; concerning the need for an aviation section: Concur. However, the overall shortage of aircraft in RVN precludes the assignment of additional aircraft to combat support and combat service support units. Aviation support must be obtained on a mission basis from local supporting Army aviation units.


f. Reference Paragraph 4a, Page 2, concerning personnel shortages: Since the 37th Signal Battalion is a STRATCOM unit, personnel are requisitioned through USASTRATCOM channels. Although the 1st Signal Brigade is not provided direct support from USARV through the requisitioning and replacement system, it has long been the policy that USARV will assist in alleviation of shortages from within available resources whenever possible.

g. Reference Paragraph 1, Page 10, concerning second in-country promotions: The 1st Signal Brigade possesses the same flexibility with respect to second in-country promotions as USARV. Use of this flexibility in policy implementation is the prerogative of Commanding General, 1st Signal Brigade. If this is a major problem area, and the brigade requests assistance in working out a feasible solution, it will be provided.

h. Reference Paragraph 2, Page 10, concerning the need for technical representatives at installation sites: Concur with the comment of the 1st Signal Brigade in paragraph 3b, 2d Indorsement.

i. Reference Paragraph 3, Page 10, concerning standard building plans: Concur. This recommendation should be submitted by the unit to the 1st Signal Brigade engineer.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
STANLEY E. SCHULTS  
Major, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl  
nc

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

17

GPOF-OT (31 Jan 67)

4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 January 1967(RCS CSFOR-65) - Hq 37th Sig Bn (Spt)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 17 MAY 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
G. R. KOBAY  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

1 Incl  
nc

19

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
ICORPS TACTICAL ZONE



Incl 1